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Restoring the Poetics of
Transcendence:




　　“God the Creator of all things…today we would like to begin 
studying Thy high work and will through the literature of a poet, 
prophet and saint whom Thou establishedest in the world. May each 
of us ourselves become a poet, prophet and saint worthy of studying 
his work, for it is only poets that can recognize a poet as such, proph-
ets a prophet, and saints a saint. Yet we know that any soul that doth 
sincerely revere Thy sublimity and trusteth in Thy mercy is granted 
to be so, for poetry is not merely the composition of words but the 
cadence of a spirit.” *1
The excerpt above is from the prayer offered before thirty or so young 
people, who gathered in their teacher’s house on one Sunday in May, 1945. 
The teacher who offered this prayer was Tadao Yanaihara (1893-1961). He 
was about to begin weekly lectures on Milton’s Paradise Lost (PL). The 
lectures were to last for the two years that saw the defeat of Japan in 
World War II and the social confusion ensuing the defeat.
Explicitly and at times emphatically Christian, Yanaihara’s reading 
of PL may seem irrelevant to mostly non-religious readers in 2011. Yet 
precisely because of its unhesitatingly Christian stance I propose that
taking Yanaihara’s commentaries seriously can in fact be a refreshing ex-
perience to us, immersed as we are in a critical climate that is at times 
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uncritically secular. More specifically: Yanaihara challenges us to find po-
etical elements in that passage in PL historically deemed too theological 
and un-poetical, while he makes us aware of the ethical complexities in 
those lines where we are easily impressed with their eloquence. Those in-
sights are informed by Yanaihara’s faith, which made him realize the 
finiteness of human reason in the face of the transcendental deity on one 
hand, yet on the other enabled him to affirm the value of man’s intellec-
tual endeavor once its limitations are recognized. This paper aims to 
showcase some of this faith-informed criticism by Yanaihara, by looking at 
his commentaries on God’s speech in Book 3 of PL and on Satan’s tempta-
tion of Eve in Book 9. How will his reading perplex as well as provoke us? 
2
Before we discuss his reading of PL, it may be useful to briefly look at 
who Tadao Yanaihara was and how his Milton lectures came to be.  
Born in 1893 in Ehime, Western Japan, as the fourth son of a physi-
cian, at the age of 17 Yanaihara entered the First Higher School (“Ichiko”), 
a preparatory division to the University of Tokyo (“Todai”). The three 
years he spent at Ichiko was the most formative period of his life, in which 
he met two important mentors. One was Inazo Nitobe (1862-1933), a 
Quaker, then Ichiko’s headmaster, deeply respected by his students and 
whose emphasis on character-building made a lasting impact on 
Yanaihara. The other was Kanzo Uchimura (1861-1930), founder of the 
Mukyokai (Non-church) movement. Yanaihara had heard of Christianity 
through a senior friend of his, Jitsuzo Kawanishi (1889-1978), before he 
entered Ichiko, but it was during his Ichiko days that, through the influ-
ence of Kawanishi and a few more friends, Yanaihara was initiated into a 
Bible study group conducted by Uchimura and became a committed 
Mukyokai Christian. 
For the important role it has played in the reception of Milton in 
Japan, the Mukyokai movement, of which Yanaihara himself was to be-
come a prominent leader, deserves more than a passing mention*2. 
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Founded by Uchimura, an Amherst-educated Christian evangelist noted 
for his social activism (As a teacher he was forced to resign from the First 
Higher Middle School for refusing to bow to the Imperial Rescript on 
Education and as a journalist he launched a major campaign against the 
industrial pollution at the Ashio Copper Mine), the Mukyokai movement 
was characterized by its emphasis on the Biblical faith and on a prophetic 
stance against the wrongs of the society, as well as by its rejection of sacra-
ments and ordained ministry. Thus due both to its origin and to its 
principles, the Mukyokai faith has much in common with the faith of 
Milton, who not only wrote his great epic but denounced in pamphlets the 
ills of absolute monarchy under Charles I . It is no accident that, for PL 
alone, the Mukyokai movement has produced two translators: Takeshi 
Fujii (1888-1930) and Akira Arai (1932-).*3 (Let it be noted that Yanaihara, 
six years junior to Fujii at Ichiko and Todai, had a great respect for his 
senior friend. Yanaihara served as co-editor of Fujii’s collected works pub-
lished a year after his death and it was Fujii’s translation of PL that 
Yanaihara used for his lectures.) Uchimura himself referred frequently to 
Milton in his writings and saw the Puritan poet as a precursor of his own 
cause. To give just one example: “Throughout his life Milton was a noble 
and sublime non-Church Christian,” he wrote in a short essay late in his 
life defining the essence of the Mukyokai movement.*4
After completing his study of law and economics at Todai, Yanaihara 
joined the Sumitomo and Company, where he worked for three years. 
Then, to succeed Nitobe, his former mentor, who left the chair in colonial 
studies to become an Under Secretary of the League of Nations, Yanaihara 
was called back to Todai in 1920. He held the chair until December 1937, 
when, due to a pacifist view he advocated in a magazine, he was pressured 
by the then militaristic government of Japan to resign from his post. 
Though he eventually returned to Todai after the war (November 1945) 
and later served as its president (June 1951-May 1957), those seven years 
of banishment was literally a trying period in his life. Nonetheless as a 
wayfaring/warfaring Christian intellectual, Yanaihara battled to convey 
his convictions mainly through two channels. One was a monthly Bible-
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studying magazine Kashin (Good Tidings) he started in January, 1938, 
based on his Bible lectures at his home for his younger disciples. The other 
was a series of lectures on Christian classics, also for his younger disciples: 
first on Augustine (Confession, The City of God, On Trinity, and Against 
Pelagius) and then on Dante (The Divine Comedy). The lectures on PL 
were part of the series, and Yanaihara at one point considered reading 
Paradise Regained after finishing his PL lectures*5.
The prophetic and Puritanical vein of the Mukyokai no doubt made 
Yanaihara a sympathetic and empathic reader of Milton. In addition, the 
poet’s experience, in which he wrote against the detractors of the English 
Republic and as a result was, though temporarily, arrested after the 
Restoration, must have resonated with that of Yanaihara, who, during his 
banishment from Todai, kept protesting at the injustices of the militaristic 
government. For these reasons Yanaihara could identify himself with 
Milton, and as he made clear in his opening prayer, he hoped every pupil 
of his to be a Milton to truly understand him, to become “a poet, prophet 
and saint worthy of studying [Milton’s] work” so that they could read his 
epic not only with their minds but also with their hearts. Perplexing 
though it may be to us, such empathic approach surely helped Yanaihara 
appreciate the quintessential Miltonic qualities in PL―most notably his 
emphasis on God’s transcendence―and will help us, through our very per-
plexities, to question the critical assumptions that limit our reading. 
3
The long speech by God in Book 3 of PL [80-113] has long been out of 
favor with critics. Alexander Pope jeered: “God the Father turns a School 
divine.”*6 Following Pope, Herbert Grierson commented: “In Milton’s 
cosmology Heaven is the coldest region, especially when ‘God the Father 
turns a school divine’”.*7 Northrop Frye, who happened to be an ordained 
minister of the United Church for Canada as well, also referred to Pope 
and confessed: “When as a student I first read the speech in Book Three of 
PL in which ‘God the Father turns a school divine’, I thought it was gro-
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tesquely bad. I have been teaching and studying PL for many years and 
my visceral reaction to that speech is still exactly the same.”*8
There are a number of reasons why the passage has been so out of 
favor. First there is the question of the topic discussed. The speech, in 
which God “clears His own Justice and Wisdom from all imputation, hav-
ing created Man free and able enough to have withstood his Tempter”, 
speaks of predestination and free will*9: in the eye of most readers, such 
notions seem too “theological” to be dealt with aesthetically, too abstract to 
be discussed in a poem. Second, those notions discussed contain an appar-
ent contradiction: “[It isn’t] As if predestination overruled / Their will” 
says God [114-115], but if He does plan every creaturely action before-
hand, does not it logically follow that there will be no room for creaturely 
choice? And if, as He emphasizes, we are free and as such held accountable 
for our choice, can He still claim that He is in control of everything as the 
Omni-potent/-scient Sovereign? Most importantly, Milton’s God consis-
tently refuses to answer those questions one may naturally want to ask, as 
if to defy any expectation one may have of Him for His accountability: 
throughout His speech He seems egotistically intent on “clear[ing] His 
own Justice and Wisdom” while insisting on the culpability of the fallen 
angels and Man.
To counter such negative responses to God’s speech, Yanaihara in his 
explication goes out of his way to defend it. First he attempts what may be 
called a “thematic” defense. Concurring with the note to line 80 by the 
translator Fujii, in which he attacked the jeering comment by Pope, 
Yanaihara stresses the vital importance of the passage to the whole design 
of PL: “Since the whole purpose of PL is to justify the divine providence, 
one can say, with Fujii, considering the intent of Milton and the whole 
structure of his epic, that without this passage the entire PL would not 
exist.”*10 Then, against those who dismiss theological arguments as inap-
propriate in poetry, Yanaihara insists that like any other topic theology 
can be discussed poetically: “Anything can be material for poetry; other-
wise poetry would be uninteresting…even theological arguments, as long 
as they are true, are qualified to be dealt with in poetry.”*11 This advocacy 
（ 104 ）
of theology by Yanaihara as an appropriate poetical topic is no doubt 
animated by his faith, and as such it was certainly a challenge to most 
Japanese readers, who had historically been conditioned to think that only 
the beauties of nature or the subtleties of human emotion could be sung in 
poetry*12. It may also be a challenge to secularist readers of today, who, as 
if it were a matter of critical creed, tend to dismiss any theological dis-
course as irrelevant or “non-literary”.
In this way, by affirming the validity of theology as a theme in poetry, 
Yanaihara defends Milton from adverse critics for letting God speak of 
predestination / free will. Yet what is perhaps more important than this 
defense is Yanaihara’s idea of what poetry is or should be. It reveals his 
uniqueness as a non-professional but acute reader that Yanaihara sees 
the Bible as essentially poetical. Since the Bible itself is poetry, he claims, 
it was not at all improper for Milton to choose the quintessential Biblical 
theme―i.e. of man’s original sin and the Fall resulting from it. 
When I read the Bible, especially the Gospels, I feel they are 
poetry in their essence, though they are written in prose. Christ 
asserts and declares the truth with great freedom and in a beauti-
ful rhythm. In addition, when He moves from one proposition to 
another, He does so without any vacillation or hesitation. This is 
no other than the attitude of poetry and poetical composition. Far 
from weaving His argument, twist by twist, with tiny chains of 
logic, Christ leaps daringly in his discourse, and therein lies po-
etry. This can be the case with Paul’s Epistles as well. Considering 
these Biblical precedents, I think it is only fitting and proper that 
Milton chose such theological topics as man’s original sin and the 
Fall occurring thereafter.*13
Also worthy of note is that in claiming the Bible itself is poetry Yanaihara 
locates the Bible’s poetical quality in its leaps of logic: “Far from weaving 
His argument, twist by twist, with tiny chains of logic, Christ leaps dar-
ingly in his discourse, and therein lies poetry.” A few pages later Yanaihara 
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asserts: “the characteristic of the Biblical logic is in its lack of logic.”*14
Herein lies Yanaihara’s critical insight. By identifying the poetical 
quality in the Bible with its leaps of logic, Yanaihara connects the supra-
logical in faith with the supra-logical in language, thereby proposing what 
one may call the poetics of transcendence. Challenging though it may be, 
this poetics is refreshing to us in that it prompts us, steeped in a secular 
critical climate, to revise our notion of the poetical in general and our 
response to Milton’s God’s language in particular: we dismiss as “gro-
tesquely bad” His aggressively aloof language, but if we follow Yanaihara, 
will not we be able to admit poetical elements in it precisely for its aloof-
ness? Don’t we have to see poetry beyond the so-called “beautiful” or “the 
aesthetic” but also in the transcendent? In addition, as I now hope to show, 
Yanaihara’s elevation of the supra-logical over the logical may lead us to a 
less negative understanding of the tension between predestination and 
human responsibility as well as of God’s refusal to explain on the matter. 
Besides giving a “thematic” defense to what Milton is doing, Yanaihara is 
attempting an “epistemological” defense to the poet’s God’s aloofness.
Before explaining how to understand the question of predestination 
and free will, Yanaihara draws an analogy between that question and the 
way we understand time. Time, he explains, consists of the brighter half 
(day) and the darker half (night): “We do not attempt any compromise be-
tween day’s brightness and night’s darkness but recognize time both in its 
absolute brightness and in its absolute darkness. To fret over the seeming 
contradiction in this and claim that time must be either bright or dark, or 
to try to work out a synthesized compromise and explain that time is 
brightly dark or darkly bright…will not do justice to the reality of time or 
the truth of time.”*15 Rejecting in this way the exclusivist “either-or” 
attitude as well as the eclectic frame of mind, Yanaihara suggests the 
possibility of comprehending time in its totality: “One who recognizes 
what appears to be a contradiction in time and yet is above being scandal-
ized at it is one who trusts in time totally, who knows time totally.”*16
Thus pointing out the need for a “total” understanding of any matter, 
Yanaihara invites his pupils to apply a similar way of understanding on 
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the tension between predestination and free will. “When we think in mu-
tually exclusive terms, that we cannot be accountable for our action if God 
is the absolute sovereign or that He cannot be the absolute sovereign if we 
are held accountable, we miss the truth. Our insignificant logic, in which 
we prefer consistency and hate contradictions, excludes and distorts the 
reality of the matter.”*17 Then, just as he has urged on the necessity of 
comprehending time in its totality, this time Yanaihara urges on the ne-
cessity of comprehending God in His totality “Lest we be scandalized at 
the two conflicting realities but uphold both, we assume God, who is above 
illogicality and inconsistency, and believe in Him totally.”*18
What we see Yanaihara doing here is freeing God from our ratiocina-
tion, by proposing an idea of a God that stands above paradoxes and whose 
claim to transcendence lies in the very fact that He defies rational expecta-
tion. Hard as it can be for us to accept this idea of God’s freedom from 
human speculation, it does provoke us to question an unconditional trust 
we tend to put in our reason: is our reason really limitless in its capacity? 
are we always intellectually honest enough to leave an unsolvable paradox 
as it is? For himself, as a matter of faith, Yanaihara refuses to rationalize 
away paradoxes in God, even on the question of predestination and free 
will, but, choosing to let the paradoxes as they are, defends God as stand-
ing above the paradoxes: “To synthesize or attempt a compromise on the 
seemingly contradictory facts or arguments will not do justice to the 
truth…. Instead the Bible requires us to grasp them both and comprehend 
them in their entirety. Therefore we must understand that God’s will, His 
sovereignty and predestination are truly absolute, while man is absolutely 
free in his will and absolutely responsible for his action.”*19 To the charge 
that God is contradictory, Yanaihara’s answer was to claim instead His 
unconditional transcendence, to let God be God in all His seeming contra-
dictions. One may say this is exactly Milton’s own way in PL, where he 
“assert[ed]” rather than rationalized his God’s eternal providence*20; and 
the assertiveness in both awes as well as provokes their readers.  
The way Yanaihara defends God and His speech may puzzle readers 
who do not share his faith. Nonetheless, Yanaihara’s defense is valuable 
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in that it challenges us to examine our literary reaction to God’s language 
as well as our epistemological response to His attitude. By suggesting the 
Bible itself is poetry and its leaps of logic its central poetical elements, 
Yanaihara prompts us to re-read the uncompromisingly assertive lan-
guage of Milton’s God and locate the same poetical quality that he has 
found in the Bible. And by proposing an idea of a deity that is above para-
doxes, he makes us suspect that Milton’s God’s aggressive aloofness is in 
fact the proof of His divinity, that the poet shows his God to be God by 
portraying Him above our ratiocination.  In thus provoking us to revise 
our idea of the poetical and of the divine, Yanaihara’s reading of PL is use-
ful to us.
4
Few readers are able to resist the eloquence of Satan with which he 
tempts Eve [PL , IX, 684-732]. That is where Satan as a rhetorician proves 
to be at his best, and Milton himself recognizes the Tempter’s zeal when 
the poet compares him to some “orator renowned / In Athens or free Rome 
where eloquence / Flourished” [670-2]. Such is the Fiend’s command of 
language that it appeals to our emotions as well as to our reason. To be 
more precise: the Serpent knows how to make us feel rationally convinced 
while he never allows us a single chance to stop and think. The way he 
carries his argument, interspersed with conjunctives (e.g. “Of evil, if what 
is evil / Be real, why not known, since easier shunned?”[698-699] or “God 
therefore cannot hurt ye and be just”[700]), sounds like a formal syllogism, 
which makes his claim sound rational though in fact his premises are 
questionable, while series of rhetorical questions, coupled with frequent 
enjambs and caesuras, forbid us to interrupt him to form our own answer. 
These rhetorical devices alone are enough to win us (and Eve) over.
Yet in addition to these rhetorical ploys there are a few more elements 
in Satan’s argument itself that make it so irresistible. First is his 
intellectualism. In the Satanic scheme of things, knowledge comes before 
action: good done without knowing it is no good, while evil is best shunned 
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with the knowledge of it [cf. 698-699]. This is a hard logic to resist, as long 
as we value knowledge for its own sake. Second is his adherence to the 
conceptual and abstract when it comes to moral arguments. Satan chooses 
not to speak of good and evil―particularly of evil―in concrete and practical 
terms and at one point, in the form of a conditional, questions evil’s reality 
(“if what is evil / Be real”). This leads us to mind only the surface consis-
tency of the Fiend’s argument while ignoring the real and actual impact of 
evil. Third is his appeal to scientific methods, particularly to observation: 
he urges Eve to look at him as evidence (“Look on me, me who have touched 
and tasted”[686-687]) and bases his doubt in the Creation on what he sees 
(“this fair earth I see / Warmed by the sun producing every kind, / Them 
nothing”[720-721])*21. Unless one is among those who “have not seen, and 
yet have believed” (John 20:29), one is easily tempted to accept only those 
things we see―or those things the Serpent lures us to see.
How does Yanaihara respond to those subtler aspects of Satan’s temp-
tation? First, in the face of the Satanic elevation of knowledge per se, 
Yanaihara’s stance is exactly the one that Stanley Fish proposes as the 
ideal response to the Fiend: he deigns “not [to] fall into the mistake of 
considering Satan’s propositions on his terms”*22. Instead of climbing, as it 
were, onto the same ring with Satan, he ponders the real purpose of God’s 
prohibition: “Whenever we read Genesis or PL and think about the 
Serpent’s temptation, we tend to discuss whether it is right or wrong to 
gain knowledge…whether the knowledge of good and evil is itself morally 
good or evil. But that is not the way Genesis poses the question: the real 
question is whether to obey His Word or not.”*23 It is characteristic of 
Yanaihara that, in dismissing Satan’s argument, he returns to the way 
the Bible itself makes its claim and notes how it rejects knowledge for the 
sake of knowledge and ratiocinative explanation. When a page later 
Yanaihara concludes the chapter, he again has his conclusion based on 
the Biblical way of discourse: “We are liable to eclecticism and excuse 
that though faith is important, knowledge is important as well. Yet Genesis 
demands of us an alternative judgment: that we should choose either 
knowledge or faith…the Serpent has chosen knowledge, but what God de-
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sired was faith.”*24 One may stagger at the calm and unhesitating way 
Yanaihara asserts the primacy of faith over knowledge, of God’s ordinance 
over human reasoning, yet this must be taken as the natural consequence 
of Yanaihara’s faith, in which he acknowledges God’s unconditional 
transcendence: if God is above all things, He must be above human under-
standing, and as such His commands must be obeyed whether their justice 
is intelligible or not.
Second, to the Satanic strategy of adhering to the abstract: Yanaihara 
is aware of the Fiend’s equivocation: that he slyly hides the fact that there 
are two kinds of knowledge―theoretical and experiential, we may term 
them―and that to seek the conceptual knowledge of evil by tasting the 
Forbidden Fruit will actually be to experience evil*25. To expose this verbal 
trick, Yanaihara points to these two aspects of knowledge as he comments 
on Adam’s lines that describe the consequences of the Fall(“[W]e know / 
Both good and evil, good lost and evil got, / Bad fruit of knowledge, if this 
be to know” [1071-73]). Characteristically, the approach Yanaihara takes 
in explicating those lines is more existential than semantic, ethical rather 
than philosophical: “What Adam and Eve got through the eating of the 
fruit was not exactly the knowledge of what is good and evil itself; it was 
not that they came to know the philosophical nature of evil…Instead they 
found their life fatally disordered: they found everything in disorder, their 
own minds and their marital life. What they got was the substance of evil 
rather than its knowledge”*26. To taste the Fruit of knowledge of good and 
evil was, indeed, to taste evil, and the serious consequences this “real” as 
opposed to conceptual evil brings about drives Yanaihara to speak about it 
in terms free from metaphysical quibbling. The same drive is felt when 
Yanaihara annotates a similar phrase in Book 11 (“knowledge of good lost, 
of bad got” [XI, 87]): he stresses how, divorced from reality, knowledge, 
even of good, will be of no use: “[A]fter the Fall they knew good by knowing 
evil. They lost the power to practice good. So they knew good conceptually 
but not actively…and knowledge that is without the power to carry out 
what it knows is no real knowledge.”*27 So as to keep us vigilant to the real-
ity of evil that is casually dismissed by the Fiend, Yanaihara bases his 
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argument on man’s actual experience. It is also salutary for us in that it 
makes us wary of the lure of the conceptual and the abstract, with which 
Satan tried to win both Eve and us over. 
All this emphasis on the primacy of faith to knowledge may tempt us 
to label Yanaihara as anti-intellectual and anti-scientific, and it is undeni-
able that he sometimes seems so. This is the case when, contrasting 
Hebraism with Hellenism, he characterizes the former as faith-based and 
the latter as knowledge- or science-based, and associates, if provisionally, 
Hellenism with Satan’s (and Eve’s, after being tempted) way of thinking. 
“It can be generalized that Hebraism, or the teachings of the Bible, centers 
on faith, while the learning in Greece centers on knowledge…In the 
Biblical teachings the order of the universe comes top down, descending 
from God, while in scientism, if one calls that Hellenism, the order of val-
ues goes up from bottom.”*28 More explicitly: “If one names the logic that 
has caused the loss of Paradise, i.e. the logic of disobedience to God, 
Hellenism or scientism, what Satan tempts Eve to do, what she thinks on 
her own after the Temptation and what she urges Adam to do are 
Hellenistic and scientific, for all three acknowledge in the Fruit of Knowl-
edge not its Creator’s power but what they think to be its own power.”*29 
As long as one judges from this juxtaposition of “disobedience” with 
“Hellenism or scientism”, Yanaihara is evidently suspicious of unre-
stricted pursuit of knowledge. His suspicion on the possible danger of 
knowledge for its own sake is also expressed in this dictum: “Knowledge 
can illuminate us, but it can also plague us.”*30
However, it must be emphasized that once he solves the tension be-
tween knowledge and faith by subjecting the former to the latter, 
Yanaihara moves to affirm the value of human intellectual endeavor that 
is premised on faith: “When we stand on the premises that God is the 
Creator of all things, that He is the primary cause of the power of the uni-
verse, that man’s joy flows only from the order of faith, our knowledge can 
be useful[…]Accepting, by faith, revelation as a premise, we can proceed to 
pursue scientific research and prove our hypotheses through experiments. 
This is the proper relationship between science and religion.”*31. Subjecting 
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knowledge to faith does not mean an un-resolvable antinomy between the 
two but letting the former flourish under the guidance of the latter. More 
audaciously, Yanaihara affirms the ultimate unity of faith and science un-
der God, who he believes stands above both: “As a believer we believe 
sincerely and single-mindedly; and as a scientist we pursue scientific 
studies no less sincerely and single-mindedly. There is no contradiction 
between the two acts, for it is God who unites both. Only when one has 
faith can one believe faithfully to one’s heart’s content as well as be thor-
oughly faithful to the ways of scientific inquiries”*32. It is worth noting that 
the notion of a God that stands above contradictions, invoked when 
Yanaihara sought to explain the compatibility of predestination and free 
will, is invoked again. For him the God who asserts His omnipotence while 
insisting on creaturely responsibility is also a God who blesses and 
reconciles both faith and science: precisely because of His transcendence, 
because He is above paradoxes, He can harmonize those two activities that 
seem at first sight mutually exclusive and incompatible. 
In the eye of some faith seems too much of a donné to Yanaihara, and 
as such they may find easily predictable his response to Satan’s tempta-
tion, in which he simply refuses to play the Fiend’s game. Yet Yanaihara’s 
criticism of Satan is still of value to us, in that it points to the danger of 
ignoring the real ethical issue in our emphasis on the abstract. Moreover, 
Yanaihara’s emphatic insistence on the primacy of faith does not end in 
the sweeping dismissal of knowledge and scientific methods. Rather, by 
invoking the idea of a God that stands above the tension between faith and 
science, he shows how the seeming rift between the two can be reconciled 
and that science can have its fruitful place within faith’s order. In thus 
giving value to man’s intellectual endeavor while holding fast to his faith, 
Yanaihara can be seen as an inheritor of Christian humanism, not unlike 
Milton himself. 
5
To many of us faith often seems incompatible with man’s intellectual 
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or aesthetical activities. As long as it acknowledges as its basis an experi-
ence that is beyond understanding, faith seems to discourage rather than 
to promote intellectual inquiries, and when it involves hard teachings 
with abstruse theological vocabulary, it does not seem to have much affin-
ity with what we usually consider to be “aesthetic.”
Reading Yanaihara’s commentaries on PL makes us skeptical to such 
assumptions. In finding poesy in Jesus’s assertiveness in the Gospels, he 
leads us to locate poetical elements in God the Father’s defiantly assertive 
speech in PL. This broadens our idea of the poetical, or more generally, of 
the aesthetical, in their relation to faith, as it provokes us to notice a 
unique kind of poetry in the relentlessly transcendental or in what Rudolf 
Otto would have called Das Heilige.*33 Yanaihara challenges us to re-con-
sider our assumption on the relation between faith and science, too. In his 
commentaries on Satan’s temptation speech, Yanaihara consistently in-
sists on the primacy of faith over knowledge, yet instead of descending into 
a wholesale rejection of scientific enquiries, he seeks to acknowledge their 
value by having them premised on faith and revelation. This “vertical 
ordering”, as it were, frees us from our automatic assumption on the 
incompatibility between faith and knowledge, between revelation and 
experiments.
Yanaihara, in short, is an example of a reader whose faith does not 
limit his critical acumen but sharpens and enhances it. And in prompting 
us to examine our response to PL as well as our assumption on faith’s re-
lationship to the aesthetic and to the scientific, Yanaihara’s reading is not 
only relevant but potentially refreshing to all Miltonic readers.
Notes 
I first came to know Yanihara’s lectures on PL when I wrote on the contrast 
between God’s speech and Satan’s temptation twelve years ago (“Language of 
Transcendence, Language of Lies―A Reading of PL―“[Bulletin of Toyo Gakuen 
University, volume 7. pp.107-123. Nagareyama, 1999]) . It has since been my con-
viction that his commentaries merit discussion in their own right. 
For Yanaihara’s biographical information I refer to Yanaihara-Tadao-Den (A 
Life of Tadao Yanaihara. [Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo, 1988]), a detailed biography by 
（ 113 ）
Isaku Yanaihara, his eldest son. His own Watashi-no-Ayunde-kita-Michi [My 
Journey. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1975], which contains an extended 
interview as well as several autobiographical essays, has also been of help. I was 
not able to consult the latest study of him, Yanaihara Tadao (U of Tokyo P), 
edited by Shigehiko Kamoshita and three other Todai professors, published in 
November, 2011. The book includes contributions by some of Yanaihara’s immedi-
ate disciples and his disciples’ disciples.
Yanaihara’s lectures on PL are included in Volumes 8, 9 and 10 of Doyogakko 
Kogi ([Saturday School Lectures: henceforward SSL) edited by Isaku Yanaihara 
and Wakao Fujita (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo, 1968-69). All quotations from Yanai-
hara’s lectures are based on this edition and the translations are by me. Though 
named “Saturday School Lectures”, the PL lectures were in fact held on Sunday 
due to a difficult traffic condition in the war-time (and sometimes air-raided) 
Tokyo. I’ll refer to the passage cited with the number of the volume, the lecture 
number and the page number. (e.g. SSL, vol. 8, #1, p.7) 
Quotations from PL are from: Alastair Fowler ed., Milton: Paradise Lost 
(1968. Revised 2nd ed.. Harlow: Pearson Longman, 1997). The edition Yanaihara 
is presumed to have referred to most is The Poetical Works of John Milton, with 
Introductory Memoir, Notes, Bibliography etc (The “Albion” Edition. London, 
Frederick Warne and Co,1896). 
*1　   SSL, vol.8, #1, p.7
*2　  On the role Mukyokai has played in the Japanese reception of Milton: see 
Takero Oiji, “Milton and Puritanism” (in Japanese) in the Renaissance Insti-
tute ed., Eikoku Runessansu to Shukyo: Moa kara Miruton made [Religion in 
English Renaissance: from More to Milton. Tokyo: Aratake Shuppann,1975], 
pp.165-169 and Akira Arai, “Kanzo Uchimura and Milton” (in Japanese) in his 
Miruton to Sono Shuhen [Milton and Related Subjects. Tokyo: Sairyu-sha, 
1995], pp.223-235.
*3　  Takeshi Fujii, Rakuen-Soshitsu (Tokyo: Iwanami, the Pubishers, 1926-27). 
Arai Akira, Rakuen-no-Soshitsu (Tokyo: Taishukan, 1978). Fujii's translations, 
together with his notes, are reprinted in SSL.
*4　  Kanzo Uchimura, “On Non-Church-ism” (in Japanese). Uchimura Kanzo 
Zenshu (The Collected Works of Kanzo Uchimura), vol.30 [Tokyo: Iwanami, the 
Publishers, 1982], p.438. Quoted in Oiji, pp.168-169 and in Arai, p.232.
*5　  Yanaihara, Watashi-no-Ayunde-kita-michi, p. 54. Yet in his first PL lecture we 
found him say: “After finishing PL we want to read Kant.” SSL, vol.8, #1, p.10. 
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*6　  Alexander Pope, Satires and Epistles of Horace (Epistle II, i, l. 102). Aubrey 
Williams ed., Poetry and Prose of Alexander Pope.
*7　  H. J. C. Grierson, Milton and Wordsworth: Poets and Prophets (London: Chat-
to & Windus, 1960), p.103
*8　  The Aims and Methods of Scholarship in Modern Languages and Literatures, 
ed. James Thorpe (MLA, 1963), p.64. Quoted by Stanley Fish in Surprised by 
Sin: The Reader in Paradise Lost [1967. 2nd ed.. London: Macmillan, 1997], 
pp.80-81.
*9　  from “The Argument”, Book3, PL.
*10　SSL, vol.8, #16, p.349. In the note Fujii wrote: “There is no doubt that this is 
the most important passage in PL. It is totally irrelevant for those who do not 
understand this to accuse this passage of lacking in literary tastes. Shame on 
those accusers, such as Pope, who said ‘God the Father turns a School divine.’” 
It is unfortunate, however, that Fujii failed to get the adjective meaning of 
“school” (“Of or pertaining to Scholasticism”) and thought “divine” as an adjec-
tive, not a noun, thus taking Pope’s line to mean: “God the Father opens a 
seminary.”
*11　SSL, vol.8, #16, pp.349-350,
*12　In this one may be reminded of a harsh judgment by Uchimura, who in an 
essay titled “Why Great Literature Doesn’t Arise in Japan”(in Japamese) 
avers: “In a society where people see poets as men of refined tastes, no great 
literature will be produced”. The Collected Works of Kanzo Uchimura, vol.3, 
p.181. Interestingly, Yanaihara’s advocacy of theology as an appropriate topic 
seems to me to resonate with the following remark by, of all critics, William 
Empson, a self-delared anti-Christian: “[T]he idea that there actually couldn’t 
be a moral debate in a literary work amounts to a collapse of the Western 
mind[.]” Empson, Milton’s God (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1961), p.262.
*13　SSL, vol.8, #16, pp.350-1
*14　SSL, vol.8, #17, p.360
*15　SSL, vol.8, #17, p.361
*16　SSL, vol.8, #17, p.361
*17　SSL, vol.8, #17, p.362
*18　SSL, vol.8, #17, p.362
*19　SSL, vol.8, #17, p.362.
*20　Cormican notes that what Milton means by “justification” is not “merely a 
logical demonstration” but something existential, that which must occur 
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“through a purification of the heart rather than by the reasonings of the intel-
lect.” This, of coursse, is the case with Yanaihara’s explication on PL as well. L. 
A. Cormican, “Milton’s Religious Verse,” in The Pelican Guide to English Lit-
erature, From Donne to Marvell, ed. Boris Ford (London: Pelican Books, revised 
ed., 1960), p.175. Quoted in Fish, pp.257-8.
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*22　Fish, p.255.
*23　SSL, vol.10, #52, p.44
*24　SSL, vol.10. #52, p.45.
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and Biblical Eloquence (Kyoto: Yamaguchi Publishing House, 1991). p.172. 
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(Berne: Peter Lang, 1997), p.83. Nishikawa, “Language of Transcendence, Lan-
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*26　SSL, vol.10, #55, p.101
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*28　SSL, vol.10, #53, pp.57-8
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*33　Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy (translated by John W. Harvey. 2nd ed. Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 1950), pp.1-4
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